Clinicians\u27 Transfer Evaluations: How Well Can They Assist Judicial Discretion? by Grisso, Thomas
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 71 | Number 1
Fall 2010
Clinicians' Transfer Evaluations: How Well Can
They Assist Judicial Discretion?
Thomas Grisso
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas Grisso, Clinicians' Transfer Evaluations: How Well Can They Assist Judicial Discretion?, 71 La. L. Rev. (2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol71/iss1/6
Clinicians' Transfer Evaluations: How Well Can
They Assist Judicial Discretion?
Thomas Grisso*
From its earliest years, the juvenile court exercised options for
trying some cases involving youth in criminal court. The primary
legal basis for transferring youth from juvenile to criminal court
was by the discretion of juvenile court judges.2 Kent v. U.S.
outlined due-process requirements for discretionary (judicial)
transfer as well as certain criteria to guide courts' judgments in
deciding whether to transfer on a case-by-case basis.3
Beginning in the late 1980s, a majority of states created laws
that increased the use of statutory exclusion of juveniles from
"automatic" filings of charges in criminal court by employing
certain restrictions regarding age of the juvenile and nature of the
charge.4 Many states, however, retained the option of judicial
transfer for cases that did not meet the criteria for statutory
exclusion.5 In addition, in many states, cases involving youth that
were filed in criminal court could be remanded to juvenile court by
discretion of the criminal court judge, a process sometimes called
"reverse transfer."6
Whether in juvenile court transfer proceedings or criminal
court "reverse transfer" proceedings, courts' judgments about
whether individual youth ought to be transferred are often
informed by forensic clinical evaluations performed by mental
health professionals. The legal criteria applied in a transfer case
refer in part to characteristics of youth that the court must consider
when determining whether the youth is a proper subject for
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1. The term for transferring youth from juvenile to criminal or criminal to
juvenile jurisdiction varies from state to state. Common variations are
"certification," "waiver," "bindover," and, as employed in this Article,
"transfer."
2. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile
Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 13 (Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
3. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
4. Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 45.
5. Id. at 64.
6. Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 83, 119-24.
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juvenile court jurisdiction. A century of practice has presumed that
these characteristics, focusing on youth's potential for future
criminal behavior and the ability of rehabilitation to reduce that
potential, can be assessed by mental health examiners who can
offer guidance for courts' deliberations about transfer.7
This Article informs courts and attorneys regarding the degree
to which they can depend on mental health professionals to
contribute reliable expert evidence to the legal process of transfer
in juvenile and criminal courts. Part I outlines the limited guidance
that clinicians receive from their professions and the law for
performance of transfer evaluations. Parts II, III, and IV offer
background that suggests mixed outcomes for the prospect of
clinicians' transfer evaluations being able to offer reliable
information relevant to the legal questions in transfer. There is
good evidence of the ability of transfer evaluations to provide
relevant descriptions with which courts can apply the legal
standards in weighing the implications of transfer. There is less
research evidence, however, supporting the application of that
information in ways that endeavor to answer the questions raised
by transfer criteria. Part V summarizes these considerations,
offering reasons to believe that protection of youth from improper
assessment methods and potentially inappropriate decisions about
transfer can be better accomplished when transfer evaluations (and
transfer decisions) are made in juvenile court rather than in
reverse-transfer hearings in criminal court.
I. STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFER EVALUATIONS
Transfer evaluations are intended to inform courts about the
impact of legal decisions. Thus they are "forensic evaluations."
Forensic psychology and forensic psychiatry offer standards for
forensic evaluations as work products; transfer evaluations are
obligated to meet these standards. 8 In addition, professional
consensus should guide courts regarding the conduct of transfer
evaluations specifically. Clinicians' professions provide clear
standards for forensic evaluations generally but only rudimentary
guidance regarding practice standards for transfer evaluations
specifically. Finally, clinicians must have a clear view of the
7. THOMAS GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 196 (1998);
Thomas Grisso, Forensic Clinical Evaluations Related to Waiver of
Jurisdiction, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at
321, 322.
8. See discussion infra Part I.A.
9. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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appropriate objectives of transfer hearings and evaluations, and a
consensus has arisen about the nature of those objectives.' 0
A. Standards for Forensic Evaluations
Both forensic psychology and forensic psychiatry have
developed standards and a professional consensus for the conduct
of forensic evaluations in general. The American Psychological
Association and the American Psychiatric Association both
recognize forensic practice as a specialty. A recent text on forensic
mental health evaluations listed 15 specific kinds of forensic
evaluations arising in criminal, civil, and juvenile law." Over the
past 40 years, both the professions of psychology and psychiatry
have reached a high degree of consensus regarding principles,
methods, and skills that are required for the performance of any
type of evaluation for the courts.
For example, Heilbrun's 29 "principles" of forensic mental
health assessment are sufficiently generic that they can be applied
across various types of forensic evaluation.13 They refer to basic
requirements when preparing for the evaluation, collecting data,
interpreting the data, and communicating the results. The
principles need not be reviewed here, but important examples
within two of these categories-preparation for the evaluation and
data collection-are illustrative and useful for later discussion of
transfer evaluations.
Preparation for the forensic evaluation includes being clear
about the definition of the legal question. The clinician must know
how the law defines the legal decision-in this case, what criteria
the law instructs courts to consider when making the transfer
decision. This is necessary in order for the clinician to identify the
psychological data that will be relevant for the clinician to collect,
as well as the nature of the conclusions the clinician is expected to
form based on those data.14
10. See discussion infra Part I.C.
11. KIRK HEILBRUN, THOMAS GRIsso & ALAN GOLDSTEIN, FOUNDATIONS
OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT 7-8 (2009).
12. PAUL APPELBAUM & THOMAS GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (2006); KIRK HEILBRUN, PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC
MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT (2001); HEJLBRUN, GRISSO & GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 11; GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS (3d ed. 2007).
13. HEILBRUN, supra note 12. The remainder of this Section draws
substantially from this source.
14. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC
ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 42-49 (2d ed. 2003).
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Data collection includes the need to employ methods that offer
multiple sources of information about the relevant psychological
conditions of the examinee.15 Most importantly, the methods used
must meet standards for reliability as a basis for expert opinions to
be entered into evidence in a legal case. These standards come
from two sources. First, professional literature in forensic
psychology and forensic psychiatry urges that, whenever possible,
clinicians should use theories and methods with known reliability
and validity regarding their meanings, based on empirical
research.' 6 This does not exclude the use of less empirically-based
methods for which there is a scientific basis for their reliability and
validity.
Second, standards for data collection are based in part on legal
criteria for the admissibility of expert testimony.' 7 In Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., for example, the Court offered
several factors to weigh when deciding whether an expert's
opinion has sufficient foundation: whether the method can be
empirically tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review,
whether its rate of error is known, whether there is a standardized
way of employing the method, and the degree to which the method
has been generally accepted in the relevant part of the professional
community." Methods employed in transfer evaluations, therefore,
could be subjected to scrutiny regarding these factors when
questions of admissibility are raised.
These requirements apply similarly to transfer evaluations as to
any other forensic evaluation. However, each different type of
forensic evaluation requires additional guidelines related to its
specific forensic purpose.
B. Guidelines Specific to Transfer Evaluations
A review of professional literature on juvenile transfer
evaluations indicates that clinicians have little guidance for this
specialized forensic evaluation. There are no national statistics on
the frequency of transfer evaluation requests by juvenile courts.
There have been no studies on the nature and quality of transfer
evaluations as they are performed in everyday practice. No book
has ever been published solely on juvenile transfer evaluations.
15. HEILBRUN, supra note 12, at 99-107.
16. See generally GRISSO, supra note 14; HEILBRUN, supra note 12;
MELTON ET AL., supra note 12.
17. FED. R. EvID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
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A number of book chapters and journal articles have offered
commentary on transfer evaluations, most of them appearing in the
professional literature only within the past 15 years.' 9 This small
body of literature does not offer a professional consensus regarding
how a juvenile transfer evaluation should be conducted. Major
textbooks on forensic evaluation typically offer a paragraph or two,
or nothing at all, regarding transfer evaluations. For example, the
latest edition of the leading text on forensic psychological
assessments does not discuss transfer evaluations specifically but
merely has a brief section on evaluating amenability to
rehabilitation as well as a sample transfer evaluation report.2 0
Recently a project reported progress in the development of a
standardized assessment tool for identifying critical characteristics
of youth that are relevant for transfer decisions.21 But it stands
alone as a specialized tool for clinicians' transfer evaluations. All
of this is in stark contrast to other areas of juvenile forensic
evaluation, for which extensive guidelines and considerable
professional consensus are available: e.g., evaluations of child
custody, of juveniles' competence to stand trial, of juveniles' risk
of violence, and of child abuse and neglect.22
19. See, e.g., Richard Barnum, Clinical Evaluation of Juvenile Delinquents
Facing Transfer to Adult Court, 26 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 922 (1987); Charles P. Ewing, Juveniles or Adults? Forensic
Assessment of Juveniles Considered for Trial in Criminal Court, 3 FORENSIC
REP. 3 (1990); Thomas Grisso, Evaluations for Waiver to Criminal Court, in
FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 195 (1998); Grisso, supra note 7, at 322;
Ivan Kruh & Stan Brodsky, Clinical Evaluations for Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court: Current Practices and Further Research, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
151 (1997); James L. Loving & Nicholas S. Patapis, Evaluating Juvenile
Amenability to Treatment: Integrating Statutes and Case Law into Clinical
Practice, 7 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 67 (2010); Stephanie P. Penney &
Marlene S. Moretti, The Transfer ofJuveniles to Adult Court in Canada and the
United States: Confused Agendas and Compromised Assessment Procedures, 4
INT'L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 19 (2005); Randall T. Salekin, Clinical
Evaluation of Youth Considered for Transfer to Adult Criminal Court, 2 J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 55 (2002); Philip H. Witt & Frank J. Dyer, Juvenile
Transfer Cases: Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 25 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
581 (1997).
20. MELTON ET AL., supra note 12, at 477-79, 661-68.
21. RANDALL SALEKIN, RISK-SOPHISTICATION-TREATMENT INVENTORY:
PROFESSIONAL MANUAL (2004); Randall Salekin et al., Risk-Sophistication-
Treatment Inventory, in MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE 341 (Thomas Grisso, Gina Vincent & Daniel Seagrave eds.,
2005).
22. For recent reviews of forensic assessment methods in these areas, see
KAREN BUDD, JENNIFER CLARK & MARY CONNELL, EVALUATIONS FOR CHILD
PROTECTION (forthcoming 2011); GERI FUHRMANN & ROBERT ZIBBELL,
EVALUATIONS FOR CHILD CUSTODY (forthcoming 2011); ROBERT D. HOGE &
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Nor do most juvenile forensic examiners have extensive formal
training in performing transfer evaluations. There are a significant
number of psychiatry fellow and psychology post-doctoral training
programs nationwide for specialization in forensic evaluation
practice. Only a few of these programs offer specialization in
juvenile forensic practice, however, and even those typically provide
experience in performing only a limited number of transfer
evaluations during the typical one-year specialized training program.
This description of the relatively uncertain state of the art for
transfer evaluations is striking considering that clinicians have
been performing transfer evaluations for juvenile courts since the
early part of the twentieth century, anecdotally with considerable
frequency. The literature, research, and standards of practice
specific to transfer evaluations offer clinicians less professional
guidance than can be found for most of the 15 types of forensic
evaluations that constitute the domain of clinicians' forensic
contributions to criminal, civil, and juvenile courts. 23
As noted earlier, this does not mean that clinicians are without
guidance for conducting transfer evaluations. They are guided by
an extensive literature on the general principles of forensic
assessment and, as will be reviewed in Parts II, III, and IV, on
guidelines that at least focus their assessment process on the
specific questions in transfer cases. But the lack of specific
guidelines for transfer evaluations has implications for their use in
juvenile court proceedings. Without a consensus in the literature
regarding the conduct of transfer evaluations, it is likely that the
evaluations will manifest considerable variability in how they are
conducted and reported from one clinician to another.24 This
increases the likelihood that two or more clinicians in a transfer
case will use different methods and arrive at different opinions,
there being no "standard" way to perform such evaluations.
C. The Objectives of Transfer Evaluations
As previously mentioned, clinicians who perform forensic
evaluations must begin with an understanding of what the law
wants to know by way of expert opinion, so that their evaluations
D.A. ANDREWS, EVALUATION FOR RISK OF VIOLENCE IN JUVENILES (2010);
IVAN KRuH & THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATION OF JUVENILES' COMPETENCE TO
STAND TRIAL (2009).
23. HELLBRUN, GRISSO & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11.
24. We can only speculate about this, however, in the absence of any
systematic research studies of transfer evaluations.
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are conducted in a manner that is relevant to the law's concerns. It
is expected that forensic clinicians will read the relevant statutes
and appellate cases in the state in which they practice, in search of
criteria that will guide their evaluations. In addition, they are likely
to read digested reviews of the law of transfer as published in
journals and books in the field of forensic psychology or forensic
psychiatry. It is instructive, therefore, to review what that literature
tells them with regard to the legal standards and criteria for transfer
cases. Standards for transfer to criminal court vary somewhat
across jurisdictions, and their meanings are open to considerable
differences in interpretation. But they do offer structure at the
broadest level, and a transfer evaluation that does not begin with
these general standards as its guide is open to challenge.
Across the years, clinicians have been consistently informed
that reviews of the states' transfer laws have identified three
concepts that constitute the focus for transfer hearings. 2 5 They are
(1) risk of danger to others (or "public safety"), (2) amenability to
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system, and (3) level of
sophistication-maturity.26 Clinicians, then, are urged to use these
concepts as the focus of their transfer evaluations when identifying
the nature of the data that they should obtain and the interpretive
objectives of the evaluation.
These three concepts have evolved through analyses of courts'
applications of legal criteria in transfer cases as well as empirical
research that synthesized the criteria that judges and attorneys
claim to apply.2 These concepts are consistent with the factors that
were outlined in Kent, but they do not simply repeat Kent's eight
factors.28 This is because several of the factors in Kent are not
clinical matters (e.g., whether the case has prosecutorial merit and
the desirability of trial in criminal court because the case involves
adult associates).29 Other factors such as "previous history of the
youth" are so general that they provide no guidance for
examiners.3 0
The identification of these three concepts is of utmost
importance for guiding transfer evaluations. Yet they are
ambiguous in ways that will allow for variability among clinicians'
25. See supra note 19.
26. See supra note 19.
27. Dia N. Brannen et al., Transfer to Adult Court: A National Study ofHow
Juvenile Court Judges Weigh Pertinent Kent Criteria, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 332 (2006); Thomas Grisso, Alan Tomkins & Pamela Casey, Psychosocial
Concepts in Juvenile Law, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 403 (1988).
28. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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interpretations of what the factors mean. These ambiguities will be
discussed in Parts II, III, and IV. In addition, the three concepts
clearly are not distinct and separate from each other. A judgment
about future danger to others will be influenced by one's
perceptions of whether the youth is sufficiently amenable to
rehabilitation to respond to efforts to modify his behavior.
Moreover, amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice
system may be seen as more or less likely depending on a youth's
level of cognitive and emotional maturity. This creates difficulties
in identifying psychological factors as related to any particular
concept.
How, then, can forensic clinicians address these concepts in
their transfer evaluations? What methods are at their disposal to
assess youth's amenability to rehabilitation, their risk of future
danger to others, and their sophistication and maturity? Parts II, III,
and IV address the clinical application of these three concepts,
with special attention given to evidence of the reliability and
validity of methods that are available to clinicians in fulfilling
these objectives.
The following three Parts do not necessarily describe how most
clinicians perform transfer evaluations. This analysis takes a
different perspective. It considers the assessment task, based on the
legal demands, and presents what may be considered the best that a
clinician can do in light of current scientific knowledge and
clinical methods. It is possible that the methods described here
exceed the "average practice" of clinicians in their current
performance of transfer evaluations.
II. ASSESSING RISK OF DANGER TO OTHERS
The volume of scientific literature on assessing risk of future
aggression has become large and complex during the past 30 years,
and methods for using this knowledge in clinical assessment have
grown apace.31 Through this literature, supported by a vast array of
research studies, a number of observations about the practice of
risk assessment have gained general acceptance in the field.32
Similarly, a significant body of knowledge has developed
31. See HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT (Randy K. Otto &
Kevin Douglas eds., 2010).
32. See RANDY BORUM & DAVID VERHAAGEN, ASSESSING AND MANAGING
VIOLENCE RISK IN YOUTH (2006); MELTON ET AL., supra note 12; VERNON
QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK
(1998). All assertions in Part II.A, infra, regarding "general acceptance" are
supported by these three sources.
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regarding the nature of aggression in youth 33 and methods for the
assessment of youth's potential for aggression, violence, and
repeated offenses. 34 The application of this information in transfer
evaluations, however, is subject to several important limitations. 35
A. Overview ofPrinciples for Risk ofHarm Assessments
First, the field long ago discarded the notion that clinicians
should try to predict that individuals "will" or "will not" engage in
aggression against others in the future because they have learned
that dichotomous ("yes" or "no") predictions of aggression in
individual cases are doomed to be wrong more often than right.36
What clinicians now aim for is a reasonable estimation of the
likelihood or probability of future aggression. Thus examinees'
scores on a risk assessment tool can be used to classify them in
groups of persons who scored similarly and have demonstrated a
low or high base rate of subsequent aggression against others. For
many tools of this kind, a high base rate represents a 40 to 60%
likelihood of future aggression.3 7 Moreover, only a minority of
persons in offender populations score in the high-risk range on
such instruments. 38
Second, there is general acceptance that clinicians seeking
estimates of the likelihood of future aggression should employ risk
factors (e.g., age at first offense, frequency of prior offenses, and
certain traits) that have been shown to have empirical relations to
future aggression. As described later, many structured tools for use
in risk assessments employ such risk factors.39 They also provide
for scores or ratings of the factors, which are often combined
mathematically to arrive at summary scores that assign examinees
to risk categories, based on research samples that have been shown
to have low, moderate, or high rates of future aggression. Although
many tools use this "actuarial" approach, others provide for
"structured clinical judgment." The latter methods allow clinicians
to use risk factors more flexibly, as long as the factors that they use
are empirically validated and the clinician rates the examinee on
those factors to provide anchors for their decisions.40
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. See infra Part II.D-E.
36. John Monahan, Violence Prediction: The Last 20 Years and the Next 20
Years, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 107 (1996).
37. JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK AsSESSMENT (2001).
38. Id.
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. See BORUM & VERHAAGEN, supra note 32.
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Third, when employing these methods, clinicians are urged to
be careful to choose those that have been validated for the actual
outcomes that are relevant for their assessment task. For example,
some risk assessment tools have been validated for identifying
recidivism in the form of any crime, although others have been
validated for purposes of identifying recidivism for violent
offenses or specific types of offenses (e.g., sex offenses). Some of
the latter assess for any future aggressive behavior, although others
assess specifically for future arrests for offenses involving harm to
others.
Finally, practice standards urge clinicians to make
"conditional" risk estimates. The estimated risk of future
aggression against others is often dependent upon the context, not
merely the characteristics of the individual. Two contexts are
particularly important for the present analysis. One is the
environment in which an individual is likely to reside in the future.
Some environments are more structured and secure than others,
thus creating different conditions that may increase or decrease the
likelihood of violence. Another context is the temporal definition
of "future." Any estimate of aggression in the near future (e.g., the
next year) is likely to be more accurate than for the long-range
future (e.g., many years after the assessment).
This matter of context and "conditional" risk is of special
significance for courts' transfer decisions.4' In such a case, the
court must attend to whether the youth is likely to harm other
youth if placed in juvenile justice facilities, as well as whether the
youth is likely to create a generally increased public safety risk if
the youth escapes from such facilities. From a temporal
perspective, both of those risk estimates have to do with relatively
immediate risk (i.e., within the next year or two). But courts
contemplating transfer are also interested in whether the youth is of
a type that will continue to present a substantial risk of violence
continuing into adulthood. Thus clinicians are often faced with
making not one risk estimate, but several. Can the youth manage
impulses if placed in a secure juvenile facility? Would he present a
significant risk if he were not in that facility but rather in
unsupervised situations in the general community? Is this a youth
who is going to continue to be a long-range risk into adulthood,
thus suggesting that the use of juvenile justice resources is
questionable? The clinician must face the possibility that the
answers to these three questions are not all the same.
As noted earlier, the scientific and clinical literature that is
available to guide clinicians in making risk estimates of future
41. See Glusso, supra note 7, at 128-30.
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aggression is vast. However, that literature is not so large regarding
estimates of future aggression among youth. Moreover, very little
attention has been given to applying that research in transfer
evaluations. What can courts reasonably expect of clinicians who
employ their best risk-of-aggression methods to address whether a
youth presents a significant "danger to others," as that concept
relates to the question of transfer?
B. Youth Violence in a Developmental Context
When assessing youth for risk of future aggression, clinicians
are aware of a number of difficulties they face compared to similar
assessments of adults. Youth are assessed in the context of
adolescence, a period of development that has significant
implications for making estimates of future behavior based on
present behavior.
Aggression is nearly normal for adolescent boys.42 Most of this
aggression is minor, but adolescence is a developmental stage
marked by impulsiveness, sensation-seeking, and risk-taking." Not
surprisingly, per-capita arrest rates for felonies begin to climb
around age 14 and continue to rise until they peak in the late teens,
after which they subside."
If a youth engages in violent behavior that is serious enough to
result in arrest, there is often some increase in the likelihood of
future harm to others compared to a youth who has not been
arrested for a violent offense-at least in the short run. In the long
run, the nature of a youth's offense has far less value for assessing
the likelihood of continued harm in adulthood. Most adolescents,
even those who commit very serious offenses as juveniles, do not
continue to engage in such behaviors in adulthood.4 5 Thus, when
making longer-range estimates, clinicians performing risk-of-
42. Delbert Elliott, Serious, Violent Offenders: Onset, Developmental
Course, and Termination, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1994).
43. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future
Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28 (2009); Laurence
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as
Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764
(2008).
44. Statistical Briefing Book: Age-Specific Arrest Rate Trends, OFF. JuV.
JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/qa05301
.asp?qaDate=20040801 (last updated Aug. 1, 2004).
45. Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent
Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674
(1993); Terrie Moffitt & Avshalom Caspi, Childhood Predictors Differentiate
Life-Course Persistent and Adolescence-Limited Antisocial Pathways Among
Males and Females, 13 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 355 (2001).
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future-harm evaluations with youth who have engaged in violent
offenses face an interesting circumstance. They must begin their
evaluations with a presumption that these youth are not likely to be
high-risk as they age into adulthood. Then the clinicians seek data
that will confirm or disconfirm that presumption.
The fact that youth continue to change in their cognitive,
personality, and social characteristics throughout adolescence
creates other significant challenges for estimating likelihood of
future aggression. Long-range estimates about future adult
behavior are even more difficult when assessing a young teenager
(e.g., younger than age 15), simply because there is more time for
biological, psychological, and social development to alter the
youth prior to adulthood. In addition, adolescents are more prone
to variability in their behavior from week to week or month to
month, thus increasing errors in estimates about a youth's "typical"
behavior based on evaluating the youth at a particular point in
46time.
C. The State ofJuvenile Risk Assessment
Despite these difficulties inherent in risk estimates during
adolescence, research on the relation of present and future
aggression among youth has made exceptional strides in the past
15 years.47 Two important things have happened to greatly
improve the prospect for assessing risk of future aggression among
youth. One is the evolution of a "best practices" standard in
forensic clinical assessment that insists on the use of evidence-48based practices in performing forensic assessments. This means
that if there is reasonable research evidence that one or more
assessment methods for a particular purpose have known reliability
and validity, failure to use one or more of those methods is inferior
clinical forensic practice.
The other advance, as noted in current reviews, is the recent
development of several assessment tools for assisting in estimation
of risk of future violence or aggression in adolescents, many
having risen to the level of evidence-based practices within the
past ten years. 49 For example, the Youth Level of Service/Case
46. LAURENCE STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE (5th ed. 1999).
47. KIRK HEILBRUN, NAOMI GOLDSTEIN & RICHARD REDDING, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY: PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION (2005); ROLF
LOEBER & DAVID FARRINGTON, SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS:
RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS (1998).
48. HEILBRUN, GRIsso & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 55-63.
49. HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 31; HOGE &
ANDREWS, supra note 22; Gina Vincent, Anna Terry & Shannon Maney,
[Vol. 71168
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Management Inventory (YLS/CMI) uses a number of empirically
derived risk factors that are scored and summed to provide a
quantitative estimate of risk of both general and violent repeated
offenses in youth.so The instrument also assesses youth's needs-
i.e., characteristics or external circumstances that are contributing
to their delinquency and that become targets for "case
management" and intervention to reduce the likelihood of repeated
offenses. The Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth
(SAVRY) allows a clinician to rate youth on empirically derived
factors in four clusters: (1) historical variables regarding past
behavior and environmental influences, (2) social variables that are
known to increase risk due to the youth's associations, (3) clinical
variables involving the youth's traits or disorders, and (4)
protective factors that can mitigate repeated offenses. 5' Highly
objective criteria allow clinicians to rate the youth on these factors,
but no summary score is used. This method allows for "structured
clinical judgment" in reaching a final conclusion about level of
risk.
Substantial research evidence has accumulated regarding the
ability of instruments such as these to classify youth according to
levels of risk that are borne out by actual outcomes during periods
of one to three years after assessment.52 When used with youth
who have already offended at least once, they offer a decided
improvement in the ability to describe youth according to degrees
of risk of future harm, compared to the use of clinical intuition that
marked typical practice in earlier years.
Nevertheless, the reviews of juvenile risk assessment
instruments identify various limits in their application. Currently
little is known about potential differences among clinicians in the
way they rate the instruments' risk factors in actual practice.53 In
addition, there is some question about whether the instruments
work equally well for younger adolescents and older adolescents.54
Risk/Needs Tools for Antisocial Behavior and Violence Among Youthful
Populations, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT
377 (Joel Andrade ed., 2009).
50. ROBERT HOGE, DON ANDREWS & ALAN LESCHIED, YOUTH LEVEL OF
SERVICE/CASE MANAGEMENT INVENTORY: USER'S MANUAL (2002).
51. RANDY BORUM, PATRICK BARTELL & ADELLE FORTH, MANUAL FOR
THE STRUCTURED ASSESSMENT OF VIOLENCE RISK IN YOUTH (SAVRY) (2003).
52. See HEILBRUN, GRisso & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11.
53. Vincent, Terry & Maney, supra note 49.
54. Id.; see also Jodi Viljoen et al., Assessing Risk for Violence in
Adolescents Who Have Sexually Offended: A Comparison of the J-SOAP-II, J-
SORRA T-II, and SA VR Y, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 5 (2008).
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Clinicians and courts must also be cautious about interpreting the
meaning of "high risk" results. What is considered "high" or "low"
is always relative. Youth in high-risk categories certainly present a
greater risk than those in low-risk categories, but this does not
necessarily mean that high-risk youth will commit future harmful
offenses. As noted earlier, for many risk-of-aggression tools, "high
risk" groups of youth often have a 40 to 60% likelihood of future
aggression, which is not a probability that would be considered
"highly likely" in an absolute sense.ss
D. Application of Risk Tools in Transfer Hearings
Other limits are associated with the use of the new risk
assessment tools specifically in transfer hearings. These limits
pertain to the pretrial circumstances of transfer hearings as well as
the nature of existing validation studies in relation to critical risk
questions that transfer cases pose.
First, most of the validation studies for these instruments have
used samples of delinquent youth who were being evaluated at
some point after their adjudications.56 In contrast, risk assessments
in transfer evaluations occur prior to youth's adjudications. Some
youth will have had no prior offenses, which is a factor in some
risk tools, and it cannot be presumed that the youth's current
charges constitute "offenses" for purposes of scoring the
instrument's risk factors. Moreover, youth's pre-adjudication
emotional reactions to their offenses, or their manner of talking
about them, may be different from their post-adjudication
reactions. This could influence the rating of factors that pertain to
attitudes toward authority or degree of empathy or remorse.
Second, recall that transfer evaluations ask clinicians to address
short-term risk of future harm to others if youth are retained in (or
reverse transferred to) juvenile custody. This requires estimates of
risk in at least two short-range contexts: if placed in secure
juvenile custody and if functioning in the general community
outside youth facilities. For the two leading instruments mentioned
above,s the majority of studies validating them have used
recidivism in the general community (i.e., after release to the
community) as their outcomes measure. Fewer studies have
55. MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 37.
56. See HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 31.
57. See supra Part II.C.
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examined the tools' capacities to identify degree of risk in
58institutional settings.
Finally, transfer hearings often involve a consideration of the
likelihood that a youth will continue to present a risk of violence
beyond adolescence and into his adult years. The most definitive of
studies validating the ability of juvenile risk tools to estimate
likelihood of future violence have assessed large samples of youth
and have then followed them across some number of years in order
to collect re-arrest data.59 For the two leading instruments
previously described, the majority of these studies followed youth
for periods ranging from six months to three years.6 As a
consequence, solid information on the validity of the instruments
for assessing likelihood of repeat offenses during adulthood (e.g.,
in their 20s or 30s) is still unavailable. This suggests that the tools
do not yet offer adequate support for clinical judgments about
long-range risk, an issue often raised in transfer cases. Most of the
research efforts to discover long-range predictors have focused on
the concept discussed in the next section.
E. The Relevance of "Psychopathic Traits"
As noted earlier, the majority of delinquent youth do not
continue to engage in serious criminal behavior in adulthood.6 1 But
can we identify in adolescence those delinquent youth who will
continue to present a significant risk well beyond their
adolescence? A great deal of recent research focuses on that
question, much of it looking specifically for the precursors of adult
psychopathy. 62
The concept of psychopathy centers on a set of personality
traits that are relatively enduring and consistent for an individual
across time, relatively difficult to modify, and empirically related
to repeat offenses when measured among adult offenders. 63 The
features of personality included in the concept fall into two
58. Randy Borum et al., Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth
(SA VRY), in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 31, at 63;
Robert D. Hoge, Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory, in
HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 31, at 81.
59. See HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 31.
60. See supra note 54 (studies of the SAVRY and YLS/CMI).
61. See supra Part II.B.
62. See, e.g., Donald Lynam, Pursuing the Psychopath: Capturing the
Fledgling Psychopath in a Nomological Net, 106 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 425
(1997).
63. See generally PSYCHOPATHY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR SOCIETY (David Cooke, Adelle Forth & Robert Hare eds., 1998).
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categories. The first category, often called "Callous-Unemotional
Traits," includes various emotional and interpersonal deficits: e.g.,
grandiose sense of self-worth, manipulative tendency, lack of
remorse, and lack of empathy. The second, often called "Antisocial
Traits," includes characteristics that are likely to give rise to
irresponsible behavior: e.g., poor behavioral controls, impulsivity,
lack of long-term goals, and need for stimulation. Note that
features of the second factor are characteristic of a fair majority of
adult offenders. Theoretically, these features in combination with
the "callous-unemotional" factor identify a subgroup of offenders
(with psychopathic personality) who are especially likely to engage
in persistent, repetitive, and dangerous behavior. The adult
research supporting the relation of psychopathy to chronic and
repeated offenses among serious offenders is substantial and
convincing.6 4
There is little doubt that psychopathic traits do not merely
spring up with adulthood. Like most personality traits, they are
very likely the product of childhood and adolescent history and
development. Thus considerable research of the past 15 years
focuses on identifying psychopathic traits amon adolescents and
examining their relation to future aggression. 5 These studies
define psychopathic traits by a variety of special assessment tools
developed for use with adolescents: e.g., the Psychopathy
Checklist: Youth Version (PCL:YV), 66 the Youth Psychopathic
Traits Inventory (YPI),6 7 and the Antisocial Process Screening
Device (APSD). Moreover, many of these studies tracked youth
for sufficient periods of time to identify whether their psychopathy
scores during adolescence provide reasonable estimates of their
low or high risks for offending as adults. 69
The results of these studies have been mixed. First, there are
some questions about the instruments themselves in terms of their
psychometric properties. One major study found a significant
correlation between scores on psychopathy trait instruments when
64. David DeMatteo, John F. Edens & Allison Hart, The Use of Measures of
Psychopathy in Violence Risk Assessment, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK
ASSESSMENT, supra note 31, at 19.
65. Id.
66. ADELLE FORTH, DAVID KossoN & ROBERT HARE, PSYCHOPATHY
CHECKLIST: YOUTH VERSION (2003).
67. Henrik Andershed, Sheilagh Hodgins & Anders Tengstrom, Convergent
Validity of the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory: Association with the
Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version, 14 ASSESSMENT 144 (2007).
68. PAUL FRICK & ROBERT HARE, THE ANTISOCIAL PROCESS SCREENING
DEVICE (2001).
69. See FORTH, KossoN & HARE, supra note 66; FRICK & HARE, supra note
68; Andershed, Hodgins & Tengstrom, supra note 67.
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obtained in adolescence and scores obtained after retesting with the
instrument in adulthood.70 On the other hand, in another major
study employing three measures of psychopathic traits with older
adolescents, there was only modest overlap among the three
measures, so that some youth who scored high on any one measure
did not necessarily score high on the others.7 1 Researchers are
currently questioning whether these instruments are measuring the
same or different concepts and whether any of those concepts are
the same as the concept of psychopathy when it is applied to
adults.72
Second, as recently reviewed, a number of studies tracking
youth from adolescence well into adulthood do show a significant
relationship between high scores on psychopathic traits in
adolescence and continued offenses in adulthood,73 but some
studies do not. For example, in a recent study of youth given the
PCL:YV at ages 15 to 16 and followed for ten years, researchers
found no significant relation between scores on the measure in
adolescence and likelihood of reconviction during adulthood for
general or violent offenses. 74 Another study found no relation
between psychopathic trait scores and self-reported aggressive
offenses even when the measure of offenses was examined only
three years later. 75
Third, when studies find a significant relation between
psychopathic trait measures in adolescence and then again in
adulthood, these relations are not likely to translate into an ability
to identify psychopathic individuals at an early age. This was
recently demonstrated in a study comparing the measurement of
psychopathic traits among individuals at age 13 to their
measurement when the same youth reached age 24.76 The
correlation between the measures was .31, which researchers
consider to be substantial. Yet in the same study, the authors noted
that among the boys who scored in the highest group on the
psychopathy traits scale at age 13, only 16% scored in the
70. Donald Lynam et al., Longitudinal Evidence That Psychopathy Scores
in Early Adolescence Predict Adult Psychopathy, 116 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
155 (2007).
71. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., A Multimethod Assessment of Juvenile
Psychopathy: Comparing the Predictive Utility of the PCL:YV YPI and NEO
PRI, 21 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 528 (2009).
72. Id.; Penney & Moretti, supra note 19.
73. DeMatteo, Edens & Hart, supra note 64.
74. John Edens & Melissa Cahill, Psychopathy in Adolescence and
Criminal Recidivism in Youth Adulthood, 14 ASSESSMENT 57 (2007).
75. Cauffman et al., supra note 71.
76. Lynam et al., supra note 70.
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"psychopathic range" on the adult psychopathy scale at age 24.7
In other words, this suggests that if clinicians in juvenile court
transfer cases were to use high scores on a psychopathy traits
measure to testify that youth will "be psychopathic" when they
reach adulthood, they would be wrong 84% of the time.
Finally, studies examining the relation of measures of
psychopathic traits in adolescence and adult recidivism have found
that the results sometimes differ by gender and race. A review of
21 studies of juvenile offenders found poorer relations between
psychopathy measures and subsequent offenses in studies with
high proportions of non-Caucasian youth, as well as generall
weak or non-significant relations for female juvenile offenders.
Transfer of young women is relatively unusual in most juvenile
courts. But in some jurisdictions, African American youth will
constitute the majority for whom the transfer question is raised.
Thus, the study suggests that the use of measures of psychopathic
traits to estimate those traits or offenses in adulthood could run a
greater risk of misidentifying racial/ethnic minority youth.79
III. ASSESSING AMENABILITY TO REHABILITATION
In virtually all jurisdictions that employ discretionary (judicial)
transfer, a major question in transfer hearings is whether the youth
is "amenable to rehabilitation." Clinicians who attend to the
analyses offered in literature about transfer evaluations will
understand that the forensic meaning of this issue is somewhat
different from the meaning that might be presumed in general
clinical settings. "Amenability" in the context of transfer is a
shorthand term referring to one of Kent's criteria: "The likelihood
of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile . . . by the use of
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the
Juvenile Court."80 This standard highlights the fact that the court
must consider not only whether the youth is "changeable," but also
whether the juvenile justice system is a proper place to try to
change the youth, given society's concerns for public safety and
rehabilitation.
In this light, the amenability issue requires that clinicians have
three types of baseline information in order to form expert opinions
77. Id.
78. John Edens et al., Youth Psychopathy and Criminal Recidivism: A Meta-
Analysis of the Psychopathy Checklist Measures, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53
(2007).
79. Id.
80. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 567 (1966).
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that are relevant.8 First, of course, clinicians and the clinical and
scientific fields that support their expertise must have methods for
identifying youth's clinical and criminogenic features that would
need to change in order to accomplish rehabilitation. What
characteristics of the youth contribute to a youth's delinquency?
What is known about the modifiability of those characteristics-
for youth in general who have those characteristics and as they are
manifested in this specific youth? What is known about a youth's
receptiveness to intervention or a youth's history of failing to
respond to various types of interventions in the past?
Second, clinicians must have a thorough knowledge of the
intervention methods that are available within or through the
juvenile justice system for effecting rehabilitation, the evidence for
effectiveness of the methods that they use, and the qualities of
programs that implement those methods. What rehabilitation
programs, therapeutic methods, and placements exist in the
juvenile justice system in question? Can the system access services
outside the juvenile justice system itself (e.g., in the state's mental
health system)? Once those resources are known, what is known
empirically about the rates of success of those methods, and about
types of youth with whom those methods have had success? How
does a youth in question match up with those types of youth?
Third, clinicians and their scientific and clinical fields must be
able to identify the amount of time that is likely to be required to
create change in a youth, given that successful rehabilitation is
possible. Many transfer cases involve youth who are near the upper
age of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, beyond which the juvenile
court will no longer have custody. In these cases, the question is
not merely whether rehabilitation is possible in general, but
whether it is probable before the time that the court must relinquish
jurisdiction.8 Clinicians, therefore, must have a baseline regarding
the amount of time that is typically required for rehabilitation of
particular types of youth with the particular types of rehabilitation
services that the system can provide.
A. Youth's Needs and Potential for Change
Clinicians are probably best prepared to assess the first set of
questions described above-i.e., factors that are contributing to a
youth's delinquency as well as a youth's characteristics that may
work for or against change. The methods at a clinician's disposal
81. For an expanded discussion of the following, see GRISSO, supra note 7.
82. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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to address those questions are far too wide-ranging to review here,
but they include:
* A large domain of well-validated methods for diagnosing and
assessing mental disorders, developmental disabilities,
substance abuse, and poor adaptive functioning;
* A significant array of validated methods for assessing
personality traits, emotional dysregulation (e.g.,
impulsiveness), criminogenic characteristics, and factors in
youth's historical environments and relationships with
relevance for treatment planning;
* Methods for classifying youth according to types, patterns, or
causes of delinquent behavior;
* Measures developed to assess psychosocial needs in a variety
of domains (e.g., family functioning, peer relations, and school
functioning and behavior); and
* Clinical methods to identify intellectual abilities, cognitive
functioning, learning disorders, and brain damage and
dysfunction.
Methods for assessing likelihood of harm to others83 would
also be included here, because risk of harm is a relevant
characteristic of a youth for questions of rehabilitation. Whether a
youth presents a low or high short-term risk of harm to others will
expand or limit the range of intervention programs that can be
used, because different types of interventions are available or
possible in secure and non-secure settings.
Some of the most recent advances in structured assessment of
youth in juvenile justice settings have produced tools that are
particularly well-suited for transfer evaluations, even though that
has not been their developers' primary objective. They are
sometimes called "RNR tools," referring to their assessment of
"Risk," "Needs," and "Responsivity." 4 The YLS/CMI, for
example, offers in one-tool measures of risk of future recidivism,
several criminogenic and psychosocial needs of a youth, and
indicators that suggest the degree to which the youth is likely to
respond to interventions. The latter refers to indicators of a
youth's motivation for change, as well as characteristics of a youth
that are known empirically to be related to better intervention
outcomes. In general, the risk and needs factors in evidence-based
83. See supra Part II.
84. Kirk Heilbrun et al., Violence Risk Assessment Tools: Overview and
Critical Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note
31, at 1, 2; Don Andrews et al., Classification for Effective Rehabilitation:
Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19 (2006).
85. HOGE, ANDREWS & LESCHIED, supra note 50.
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RNR tools have received more attention in validation studies,
although the responsivity factors are currently considered
"promising" while awaiting further study.86
Clinicians and courts often use a youth's degree of
responsiveness to past interventions as one indicator of likelihood
of future prospects for rehabilitation. This is fraught with
difficulties, however. Often an intervention is unsuccessful not
because the youth is unreceptive, but it fails because the
intervention itself is inappropriate, inadequately designed, or
poorly implemented. Youth should not be considered
"unamenable," or to have failed in past interventions, if the
intervention itself had little prospect for success with youth in
general.
B. Interventions and Their Value for Rehabilitation
As noted earlier, "amenability" is not merely a characteristic of
the youth. It is also necessary to take stock of the system's
interventions, its prospects for rehabilitating youth, and the
potential to "match" youth with intervention methods.
The research literature on the impact and value of various
therapeutic and rehabilitation methods for delinquent youth has
grown substantially in recent years. It includes research on child
psychopharmacology, various forms of individual psychotherapy,
individual and group methods for cognitive restructuring and
problem-solving, discipline-oriented programs (e.g., boot camps,
behavioral modification programs, and family-based interventions.
In recent years, significant emphasis in juvenile justice has been
placed on using methods for which there is solid research evidence
of their value and discarding methods that have no research-based
benefit. During the 1970s and 1980s there was little evidence that
any interventions for delinquency actually worked.89 Today,
however, many rehabilitation and treatment methods for delinquent
youth have adequate scientific evidence for their value.9 0
86. Vincent, Terry & Maney, supra note 49.
87. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
88. For a brief summary of outcomes with these interventions, see THOMAS
GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
DISORDERS 81-100 (2004). For a more detailed review of research on the full
range of interventions, see PETER GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL POLICY (2006).
89. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974).
90. GREENWOOD, supra note 88; Mark Lipsey, The Primary Factors That
Characterize Effective Interventions with Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analytic
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Moreover, many states are increasing their commitments to these
evidence-based methods.91
The availability of evidence-based interventions greatly
improves the clinician's ability to begin the amenability analysis
with a set of interventions that use methods for which there is a
known value. Clinicians encounter several challenges, however,
when they take the next steps in the analysis.
First, the fact that a method has proved effective in research
does not mean that services in a juvenile justice system that use
that method will be effective-they may be implemented poorly.
Indeed, in a recent analytic review comparing various
rehabilitation methods, some were better than others, but facilities
that employed the good methods poorly had no more success than
less successful methods. 92 As a consequence, clinicians must keep
track of the quality of interventions as they are actually practiced
in facilities and programs in their jurisdictions. Because such
matters are rarely stable across time in most juvenile justice
systems, this creates a potential source of error in clinicians'
efforts to estimate prospects for rehabilitation.
Second, clinicians have few guides for matching types of youth
with types of intervention programs. It would seem logical, and has
long been presumed, that certain programs work better with certain
youth. The field has searched for many years for the best ways to
"match" youth with programs to maximize rehabilitation, but with
little success. Some new methods show promise, but they have not
yet been validated in ways that offer clinicians sound guidance. 93
For clinicians in transfer evaluations, this means that there is little
to assist them in identifying specific types of youth for which the
resources of the juvenile justice system (the available intervention
methods) are appropriate.
Third, clinicians in many jurisdictions encounter difficulties
identifying appropriate placements and interventions for youth
with serious mental disorders. A small but important proportion of
delinquent youth require both intensive mental health services
Overview, 4 VICTIMS & VIOLENCE 124 (2009); Blueprints for Violence
Prevention: Overview, CENTER FOR STUDY & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE,
http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
91. STEPHEN PHILLIPPI, JR. ET AL., EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN LOUISIANA (2010), available at http://public
health.1suhsc.edu/LAMC/pdf/ 20files/EBP%20Whitepaper%/ 2OFINAL%20FEB
%202010%20_3_.pdf.
92. Lipsey, supra note 90.
93. For a few instruments with this potential that are in development, see
Vincent, Terry & Maney, supra note 49.
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because of chronic mental disorders and secure care because of
their impulsiveness and danger to others. Few states can provide
this type of care within the juvenile justice system, yet psychiatric
hospital beds for children often are not sufficiently secure (or
available) to meet this need. Moreover, these are youth whose
symptoms may be reduced-and whose potential for repeat
offenses may be diminished-with adequate care, but many of
them will continue into adulthood to be clients of the state's mental
health system. For a transfer case, this creates a risk of finding a
youth "unamenable" due partly to the youth's qualities and partly
to the state's lack of an appropriate secure mental health facility. In
such a situation, a clinician must be careful to explain that the
youth's condition is treatable (if it is) and that the failure of
"amenability" lies with the system's inadequacies.
C. The Temporal Component in Amenability
A majority of youth who are the subjects of transfer or reverse
transfer evaluations are older adolescents (e.g., ages 15 to 17). In
most states, the upper jurisdictional age for juvenile justice is the
17th or 18th birthday. This greatly influences the nature of the
concept of amenability to rehabilitation. In many transfer hearings,
this means there is a limited period of time for rehabilitation to
occur. Thus a youth who might be considered to have good
responsivity and to be a good match for available programs could
conceivably be retained in the juvenile justice system if the youth
is 15, yet transferred as "non-amenable" if the hearing is occurring
at 17 in a jurisdiction in which the court will lose custody at the
18th birthday.
Clinicians have little to guide them, other than their clinical
experience and common sense, in making estimates of the length
of time that will be required for rehabilitation. Were there research
on the proportion of youth who show adequate change in
rehabilitation programs, it might be possible to identify the
proportions that manifest various degrees of change at various time
intervals after entering the programs. But no body of research has
done so with regard to youth of various ages, type and seriousness
of delinquency histories, and mental or intellectual disabilities.
D. Difficulties Inherent in Pretrial Evaluations
Other sources of error for clinicians' assessments of
amenability (and estimates of risk of future harm, as well) are
created by their pretrial context. Necessarily, much of the
clinician's information is obtained from a youth by way of
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interviews and responses to structured assessment tools. As in
many forensic contexts, people being evaluated may be motivated
to convey information in a way that they believe will produce an
outcome that is in their favor. Most forensic clinicians are attuned
to this possibility of dissimulation and deception or malingering of
mental disorders and poor cognitive abilities. There are few
methods that have been developed specifically to detect such
"response styles" in evaluations of youth, but certain strategies are
available. 94 Nevertheless, these methods are a source of potential
error inherent in the pretrial context of transfer evaluations.
The pretrial evaluation must also co-exist with protections
against self-incrimination. Concerns have been raised about the
practice of interviewing youth who face transfer hearings in a
manner that elicits a description of events or feelings related to the
charged offense. 95 The risk is too great, some believe, that the
information will taint later adjudicative hearings, even if laws
protect against the information being entered directly as evidence
against the youth at trial. Yet information about the circumstances
of a youth's offense, and the youth's thoughts and feelings
associated with it, may be important data for forming opinions
about both amenability to rehabilitation and likelihood of future
repeat offenses. When this information is not available, clinicians
must recognize-and acknowledge when questioned-that their
opinions might have been different if they had that information.
The ultimate consequence, however, is not the clinician's
frustration, but the court's lack of access to what might be highly
relevant information for considering the legal standards to reach a
transfer decision.
IV. ASSESSING SOPHISTICATION-MATUITY
Current guides for clinicians performing transfer evaluations
instruct them that transfer involves a third concept called
"sophistication and maturity." The term appeared as one of the
eight factors in Kent.96 The concept seems to direct courts to attend
to the "adult-like" qualities of a youth. Yet the purpose, meaning,
and intent of the law's interest in youth's maturity in transfer cases
has been difficult to discern. Might it be intended to reduce the risk
of harm to other youth in juvenile facilities when a more "mature,
94. JOSEPH MCCANN, MALINGERING AND DECEPTION IN ADOLESCENTS:
ASSESSING CREDIBILITY IN CLINICAL AND FORENSIC SETTINGS (1998).
95. Richard Barnum, Self-Incrimination and Denial in the Juvenile Transfer
Evaluation, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 413 (1990).
96. 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
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adult-like" person is retained in the juvenile system? Or is it
related more closely to "amenability" concerns, referring to youth
who are more "hardened" and "set" in their criminal patterns and
thus less likely to be proper subjects for rehabilitation in a system
designed for "malleable" adolescents?
A. Interpretation of "Sophistication-Maturity"
Recent analyses of "sophistication-maturity" by researchers
and commentators suggest that this component carries at least
some meaning that is distinct from the risk of harm and
amenability standards for transfer decisions.9 7 For example, based
on a national survey of juvenile court judges and clinicians, one
study suggested that "the legal term and construct of
sophistication-maturity may consist of several interrelated factors:
culpability (the ability of youth to formulate criminal intent);
criminal sophistication (progressively more involvement in
advanced criminality); understanding of behavior norms; and
ability to identify alternative actions."98 It appeared that courts
wanted to know about youth's decision-making abilities compared
to those of adults and whether youth seemed to have the capacity
to commit crimes in a manner that was premeditated, planned, or
otherwise "adult-like."
These findings have been interpreted to suggest that courts
faced with transfer decisions are asking not only, "Is this youth a
proper subject for juvenile court?" but also, "Is this youth an
improper subject for criminal court procedures and penalties?"
Woven through the factors and variables in the above description
of the concerns is an interest in whether youth have been
committing crimes "like adults" or whether youth's crimes have
occurred in the context of immature impulsiveness and without
adult capacities to weigh the consequences before they acted. The
implication is that youth who are less mature, and therefore less
capable of understanding the implications of their actions and
regulating their behavior, are less appropriate subjects for criminal
adjudication.
97. Brannen et al., supra note 27; Penney & Moretti, supra note 19; Randall
Salekin et al., Juvenile Transfer to Adult Courts: A Look at the Prototypes for
Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to Treatment Through
a Legal Lens, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 373 (2002); Randall Salekin,
Richard Rogers & Karen Ustad, Juvenile Waiver to Adult Criminal Courts:
Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to
Treatment, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 381 (2001).
98. Salekin, supra note 19, at 62.
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Commentators have proposed that courts may see very
immature youth as less appropriate subjects for criminal court for
two reasons.99 They may be perceived as less blameworthy because
of their immaturity, so that the more severe sentences associated
with criminal prosecution are less appropriate. Less mature youth
might also be perceived as less competent to participate in criminal
proceedings. That is, their immature cognitive and emotional
characteristics raise doubt about their capacities to participate in
their trials in a manner that satisfies due process regarding the
competence of defendants to stand trial.
B. Prospects for Assessing Psychological Maturity
Research in recent years has produced a great deal of evidence
regarding the ways in which adolescents and adults differ in their
cognitive, intellectual, emotional, and social characteristics. 00 The
process of maturation during adolescence proceeds from less to
greater capacity to regulate impulses, less to greater likelihood of
recognizing risks and weighing them meaningfully, less to greater
capacity to consider options and their consequences before acting,
and less to greater resistance to the influence of peers on making
choices. The evidence for these changes comes from research on
youth's behavior and on their brain development. Much of this
research has been analyzed regarding its relevance for legal
questions of blameworthiness or culpability and youth's
competence to stand trial.101 Clinicians, therefore, have a
considerable body of recent psychological information to inform
their conceptualization of the assessment of sophistication-maturity
in transfer evaluations.
Clinicians are aware of a wide variety of ways to describe
developmental maturity and immaturity. Developmental
psychologists have been measuring children's and adolescents'
intellectual abilities, cognitive development, emotional control
capacities, and social skills for about a century. A large number of
99. Penney & Moretti, supra note 19; Salekin, supra note 19.
100. For a readable review of what recent scientific research has discovered
about adolescents' capacities relevant for legal policy, see ELIZABETH SCoTT &
LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 28-60 (2008).
101. See, e.g., Dickon Reppucci, Jaime Michel & Jessica Kostelnik,
Challenging Juvenile Transfer: Faulty Assumptions and Misguided Policies, in
CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND OFFENDERS 295 (Bette Bottoms,
Cynthia Najdowski & Gail Goodman eds., 2009); Elizabeth Scott & Thomas
Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy,
83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty
by Reason ofAdolescence, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003).
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psychology's intelligence and achievement tests,
neuropsychological measures, and social maturity tests are widely
recognized for their validity. Especially promising are some new
tools and norms arising from studies of youth's decisional
capacities in relation to adults with specific relevance to
blameworthiness102 and competence to stand trial.os
One tool has been developed recently for clinicians' use,
specifically in transfer hearings-the Risk-Sophistication-
Treatment Inventory (RST-I), which provides a structured way to
assess all three of the transfer concepts.104 It is mentioned at this
point, however, because it may be especially helpful in structuring
the assessment of maturity as it relates to transfer decisions.
Sophistication-maturity in the RST-I guides the clinician to collect
data on three maturity dimensions: greater autonomy (self-
directedness), better cognitive capacities (such as foresight), and
better emotional maturity (such as ability to control impulses).
Although researchers are still accumulating initial research
evidence for the validity of the RST-I, it has been developed
sufficiently to be used cautiously by clinicians in transfer cases.
Like most forensic tools, however, it should never be used literally
to define who should or should not be transferred.
C. Limits to Assessing Maturity Relevant for Transfer
Although clinicians have many methods for assessing degrees
to which youth are immature or have matured, there are many
unanswered questions regarding the use of such data in transfer
hearings. The questions all pertain to uncertainty regarding how
the sophistication-maturity concept is applied.
First, if youth appear to be mature with regard to cognitive,
emotional, and social characteristics, does this necessarily mean
that they are proper subjects for criminal adjudication? Some youth
with better cognitive and decision-making capacities, especially
those with little delinquent history prior to their present serious
charges, may also be better prospects for rehabilitation in juvenile
justice programs because of those very capacities. Their greater
capacity to resist acting impulsively may also suggest a reduced
risk of future harm to others. Currently, clinicians (and courts) are
102. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?, 64
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009).
103. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27
LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 333 (2003).
104. SALEKIN, supra note 21.
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provided little guidance regarding how to weigh such issues,
although the RST-I recognizes that clinicians must somehow
distinguish between pro-social and antisocial youth when
interpreting the meaning of sophistication-maturity scores for the
transfer issue.
Second, what dimensions of maturity are relevant? As noted
earlier, developmental psychology has identified many ways to
express a youth's degree of maturity.10 "Maturity" itself is not a
unified concept; many youth-especially in later adolescence-
may be relatively mature in some ways and not in others. They
may be intellectually mature but socially immature; they may have
mature decision-making capacities in terms of abilities to consider
and weigh options, yet be morally immature in the ways in which
they apply those abilities. Clinicians using appropriate methods
should be able to describe a youth's development regarding most
of these dimensions. How the descriptions can be translated into a
conclusion about the youth's "sophistication and maturity" for
purposes of addressing blameworthiness is far less certain.
Finally, what degree of maturity is relevant for purposes of
transfer? Many of the assessment instruments that evaluate
cognitive and emotional development have adolescent and adult
norms. This allows clinicians to determine at approximately what
ages youth's capacities of various kinds reach their adult level, and
they allow clinicians to compare individual youth to average
performance of their age peers and to adults. This sounds
promising until considering the question, "Which adult represents
the standard for maturity to which we will compare the youth?"
Shall we compare the youth to an 18 year old because that is the
state's youngest age for criminal court jurisdiction? Will we use 21
as an age of "majority"? Or shall we use 25 or 30, given that
research indicates continuing changes up to that age in
development of brain structures that are important for decision
making and self regulation?l06 Moreover, the average maturity of
young adults in the criminal justice system is likely to be dissimilar
to the average maturity of young adults generally. Shall we
compare juveniles specifically to samples of adults in the criminal
justice system?1 07
105. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
106. E.g., Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical
Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 21 PROc. NAT'L
ACAD. ScI. U.S. 8174 (2004).
107. A decision to do so would create the need for much more research
because few measures of maturity that are currently available would have "adult
criminal norms."
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These questions are posed not to challenge the law to define
the concept according to age norms, but to point out the difficulties
clinicians face when applying their developmental measures to
address the law's interest in a youth's "maturity." Whether
clinicians provide non-empirical or empirically-based methods to
assess maturity, the vagueness of the concept allows for two or
more clinicians to disagree about a given youth's "maturity"
because they may be applying vastly different age-development
standards to define it.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER
This Article examined the prospects for clinical forensic
evaluations of youth to assist courts in making decisions in
discretionary (judicial) transfer and reverse transfer proceedings. It
is offered at a time in history when the juvenile justice systems are
rethinking their heavy reliance on statutory exclusion as a primary
transfer mechanism. The values and limits of clinical transfer
evaluations are relevant to consider in that context, because part of
the debate will focus on balancing concerns for the welfare of
juveniles and public safety. These concerns are embodied in
transfer standards themselves, and clinical evaluations of youth to
address those standards place such evaluations within the scope of
the policy discussion.
A. Summarizing the Values and Limits of Transfer Evaluations
This review offers no evidence for the quality of actual transfer
evaluations as they occur nationwide because there are no data to
address the issue. Instead, it analyzes the tasks that transfer
evaluations require and then describes which of those tasks
clinicians can or cannot do with integrity if they select and apply
the best methods currently available. This analysis presumes that
clinicians should employ evidence-based practices-those with
known reliability and validity-whenever possible. The review
suggests that some values and limits of clinicians' transfer
evaluations are relevant for both juvenile court transfer cases and
criminal court reverse-transfer cases.
Regarding values, there is a consensus about the legal
standards that clinicians are asked to address. The specific
meanings of those standards continue to be elusive, but legal and
psychological analyses have identified types of information that-
if not definitive-are at least relevant. Moreover, recent years have
provided clinicians with far better assessment methods to identify
these types of information than were available before the year
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2000.108 Special advances have been made in the development of
reliable and valid methods for assessing short-range risk of future
harm to others, symptoms of mental disorders, criminogenic needs
upon which rehabilitation can focus, and factors that may increase
or decrease youth's responsiveness to rehabilitative interventions.
The ability of these instruments to assist clinicians in describing
these characteristics to the court in reliable ways would warrant
their use, their admissibility under rules of evidence, and their
relevance.
The limits associated with transfer evaluations, however, are
especially important in light of the bottom-line questions in
transfer cases. Clinicians' methods for assessing short-range risk
offer "general" risk estimates, by and large, rather than differential
risk estimates associated with various settings (e.g., with residence
in unstructured settings in contrast to institutional, structured
settings associated with custody in secure juvenile facilities).
Clinicians do not yet have reliable methods for identifying those
youth who have embarked on a long-range, violent criminal career
that will continue into adulthood. They know which treatment
methods "work," but they have only questionable methods for
identifying which youth will prosper or fail in which types of
interventions, as well as the likelihood that they will do so.
Moreover, clinicians are without reliable methods for addressing
questions about the length of time that rehabilitation will require.
Thus, clinicians have reliable methods for describing
characteristics of youth and rehabilitation settings that are relevant
for courts to consider when applying transfer standards. In
contrast, they do not yet have reliable methods to use those data to
answer-on a case-by-case basis-the ultimate risk, amenability,
and sophistication questions at the heart of transfer decisions. The
logic that connects the reliable and relevant data to opinions about
the three standards often must be supplied by clinical judgment
rather than empirically verifiable methods.
Some would argue that this state of affairs should limit
clinicians' testimony in transfer or reverse-transfer hearings to
descriptions alone. They would ask clinicians to refrain from
moving on to make inferences about how the data they have
described can be combined to reach risk, amenability, or maturity
conclusions. A legal analysis of this assertion would require an
interpretation of standards for admissibility of expert testimony
108. For example, most juvenile risk instruments currently available were
developed within the past decade. See HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK
AsSESSMENT, supra note 31.
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under applicable rules. 0 9 But such an analysis is likely to be little
more than an intellectual exercise. Courts have long allowed
clinicians to offer expert opinions concerning which their own
professional associations have disavowed any special expertise. 10
As long as clinicians' data are reliable and relevant, their own
professional organizations would allow them to go beyond mere
description of data, forming opinions based on the theoretical and
logical use of their data. However, practice standards require that
clinicians clearly inform the court regarding the logic they use to
arrive at their opinions, and they must disclose any limitations in
their logic.'''
B. Relevance for Policy about Transfer Mechanisms
Transfer evaluations have some implications for policy
regarding the alternatives of discretionary transfer in juvenile court
and "reverse transfer" decided in criminal court. Both juvenile
court transfer and criminal court reverse transfer recognize the
need for discretionary, individualized decisions regarding whether
to adjudicate a youth in juvenile or criminal court. From a clinical
perspective, however, the circumstances of the two jurisdictions
are quite different, and the better place for transfer evaluations and
the decisions that they inform is in juvenile court.
First, transfer evaluations must be conducted by psychologists
or psychiatrists who are both child and forensic specialists. The
importance of a developmental psychological perspective has been
evident throughout this review. Risk and amenability factors are
not the same for adolescents and adults. They have a different
research literature, are influenced by different developmental
assumptions, require different interviewing skills, and employ
entirely different assessment tools. Risk of future harm as a
transfer concept is unlike the concept of risk of future harm for
purposes of adult civil commitment or criminal sentencing. And, of
course, assessing maturity and immaturity requires significant
specialization in developmental and clinical practice.
109. FED. R. EvID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
110. See, for example, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), in which the
United States Supreme Court ruled that experts' predictions of dangerousness
are constitutionally admissible despite the American Psychiatric Association's
claim that psychiatrists could not offer such reliable predictions.
I 11. See, e.g., Comm. on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists,
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 655
(1991).
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Therefore, forensic clinicians who provide services primarily in
criminal courts are unlikely to have the training and background
for performing transfer evaluations. The majority of them will not
be child-specialized in their professions. In contrast, forensic
clinicians serving juvenile court clinics typically will better
understand the developmental dynamics and specialized
assessment methods appropriate for forensic evaluations of
juveniles. To the extent that criminal courts rely on their forensic
examiners to perform transfer evaluations, there is a high risk of
inferior quality that will jeopardize public safety and fail to protect
youth from inappropriate criminal adjudication.
Second, to be useful, transfer evaluations must be understood
by those for whom they are performed. Juvenile court judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys have the backgrounds to grasp
the nature of the developmental and clinical evidence that
clinicians offer in transfer evaluations. In contrast, criminal court
judges and attorneys are less likely to be familiar with the
developmental context in which the transfer concepts must be
addressed.
Finally, research to inform transfer evaluations, and
development of improved methods, are more likely to be enhanced
if the question of discretionary and individualized decisions about
jurisdiction are made in the juvenile court. For criminal court
clinicians, transfer evaluations do not rise to the level of
importance of the more common evaluations that they are asked to
perform-for example, adult competence to stand trial or criminal
responsibility evaluations. Reverse-transfer evaluations have a
very short history and no tradition in criminal court. In contrast,
juvenile court clinicians are likely to perceive transfer evaluations
as among the more complex and demanding of the domain of
evaluations that they are asked to provide. All of the research on
transfer criteria and methods, and all of the articles on transfer
noted earlier, have arisen in the context of transfer in juvenile
court. 112 Criminal court reverse transfer is less likely to offer a
context in which any meaningful advances in assessment methods
will be realized.
The quality of transfer evaluations, of course, is not the only
factor to be considered when contemplating policy reform
regarding mechanisms of transfer. But the likelihood of better
quality in juvenile court offers one reason to favor reforms that
locate transfer in juvenile court judicial discretion, rather than
relying on statutory exclusion and criminal court options for
reverse transfer. Some will favor transfer mechanisms that file
112. See supra note 19.
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directly in criminal court because reverse transfer locates the
burden of proof with the defense. But if arguments for that burden
are compelling, one need not use statutory exclusion mechanisms
to apply it. The burden may be adjusted when applied in a juvenile
court transfer proceeding. Evaluations to address transfer's primary
objectives-the welfare and rehabilitation potential of youth, and
public safety-are more likely to serve their purpose with integrity
if reform in transfer policy adopts a greater reliance on
discretionary transfer in juvenile court than on statutory exclusion
and its reverse-transfer mechanism.

